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 Judging in Secular Times:  
Max Weber and the Rise of 
Proportionality  
David Schneiderman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Canada may have escaped some of the legitimacy concerns that have 
arisen around judicial review in the United States, for instance, those that 
turn on the degree to which original intentions should guide interpreta-
tion.1 There remains, however, a lingering legitimacy concern for the 
Canadian Supreme Court, common to many high courts in constitutional 
democracies around the world, namely, how to justify a form of rule 
where there is deep disagreement over the application of constitutional 
fundamentals. The solution, suggested in the work of the sociologist Max 
Weber, is to embrace a model of “formal” legal rationality focused on 
means-ends analysis. Weber observed that accompanying the decline of 
magic and gods — associated with modern “disenchantment” — was the 
rise of bureaucratic rationality. Modern administration conducted along 
these lines rendered law calculable and predictable, the necessary hand-
maiden of the spread of both democracy and capitalism.2 Tendencies 
toward the bureaucratization of power via this “living machine” were 
“inescapable”.3 Weber bemoaned, nonetheless, the absence of political 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law, University of Toronto (david.schneiderman@utoronto.ca). I am grateful to 
Benjamin Berger and to an anonymous reviewer for comments. I am particularly indebted to Ben for 
generously providing space for my unorthodox reflections on the rise of proportionality review. 
1 Justice Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” (2004) 23 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 345. But see Bradley W. Miller, “Beguiled by Metaphors: The ‘Living Tree’ and Originalist 
Constitutional Interpretation in Canada” (2009) 22 Can. J.L. and Jur. 331. 
2 Max Weber, “Parliament and Government in Germany” [hereinafter “Weber, ‘Parliament 
and Government’”] in Max Weber, ed., Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) [hereinafter “Weber: Political Writings”] 130, at 147-48. 
3 Id., at 158. 
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leadership in Germany to counteract these tendencies.4 “The future be-
longs to bureaucratization”, he reluctantly declared.5 The nearly 
worldwide embrace of proportionality review among apex courts around 
the world focused on means-ends calculations, I argue, validates in some 
measure Weber’s prediction.6 
This paper situates the ascendance of proportionality analysis in consti-
tutional law in the context of the difficulty of managing disagreement in 
secular states.7 I develop this idea, in the next part, with reference to Charles 
Taylor’s work on secularity and then, in the third part, by turning to Weber’s 
work on the sociology of law. In the last part, I illustrate the argument with 
reference to a handful of cases drawn from the Supreme Court of Canada 
and elsewhere. My frame is intended to be more descriptive than normative, 
though I hope, in the course of the argument, to raise some doubts about the 
utility of having judges perform this sort of function. The rise of proportion-
ality review, I argue, amounts to a concession on the part of the judiciary that 
the methodology they deploy differs little from that used by bureaucrats 
employed by other branches of government.8 
II. NOT FITTING TOGETHER 
Charles Taylor has comprehensively detailed the rise of what he calls 
the “modern social imaginary”. By social imaginary, Taylor is referring 
                                                                                                             
4 Id.; Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics” in Weber: Political Writings, id., 309. 
5 Weber, “Parliament and Government”, supra, note 2, at 156. 
6 On the global embrace of proportionality see, among others cited below, David M. 
Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 162; Alec Stone 
Sweet & Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” (2008) 47 Colum. 
J. Transnat’l L. 72 [hereinafter “Stone Sweet & Mathews”]. 
7 References to the “secular” are drawn principally from Charles Taylor, Modern Social 
Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004) [hereinafter “Taylor, Modern Social 
Imaginaries”] and Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) 
[hereinafter “Taylor, A Secular Age”]. See also the discussion of secularization in Charles Taylor, 
Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), c. 18 
(“Fractured Horizons”). The term is a modern construct that, Benson maintains, conceals its own 
“hidden faith”: Ian T. Benson, “Notes Toward a (Re)Definition of the Secular” (2000) 33 U.B.C. 
L. Rev. 519, at 521, 546. 
8 This formulation resembles Kennedy’s account of the judicial embrace of balancing by 
American liberal legalists. See Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication [fin de siècle] 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), at 322 [hereinafter “Kennedy, Critique”]; cf. Max 
Rheinstein, “Introduction” [hereinafter “Rheinstein”] in Max Rheinstein, ed., Max Weber on Law in 
Economy and Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954) xvii, at xlvi. See also Stone 
Sweet & Matthews, supra, note 6, at 87. I have more to say about the relationship between balancing 
and proportionality below, in text associated with notes 76-87.  
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to the way in which we, in the occidental West, understand our “fitting 
together” — what we understand our collective expectations to be and 
some of the deeper normative premises that ground these expectations.9 
God is no longer part of this normative matrix. In certain milieux, admits 
the believer Taylor, it is “hard to sustain one’s faith”.10 That is because 
the normative premises of the modern social imaginary rule out the 
presence of gods.  
In the contemporary world, we will have abandoned the idea of a 
higher being or order that structures our polity. This is what Taylor calls 
the “great disembedding”,11 resulting in the rejection of hierarchical or-
der in favour of a levelling of possibilities, formulated in the private 
domain and exhibited by what we today call “identity”, in which all pos-
sibilities are on the table. This is the “rejection of higher times”, observes 
Taylor, in favour of secular times that are “purely profane”.12 This is a 
“purely self-sufficient humanism” that accepts no final goals beyond 
human flourishing, nor allegiance to anything else beyond this flourish-
ing”.13 The social imaginary, then, portrays society as horizontal rather 
than vertical.14 
As deep disagreement resides within Taylor’s modern imaginary,15 
conceptions of justice compete for supremacy, and so the state resembles 
what Lefort describes as the “empty space” of sovereignty, periodically 
                                                                                                             
9 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, supra, note 7, at 23; Taylor, A Secular Age, supra, 
note 7, at 171. There are, we must assume, many social imaginaries, or variants of modern 
secularism, even within the Occident. See Talal Assad, “French Secularism and the ‘Islamic Veil 
Affair’” The Hedgehog Review (Spring & Summer 2006) 93, at 101 (“Varieties of remembered 
religious history, of perceived political threat and opportunity, define the sensibilities underpinning 
secular citizenship and national belonging in the modern state”). 
10 Taylor, A Secular Age, supra, note 7, at 3. 
11 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, supra, note 7, at 50. 
12 Id., at 90; Taylor, A Secular Age, supra, note 7, at 209. 
13 Taylor, A Secular Age, id., at 18. 
14 Id., at 209, 392; also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Horizontal Society (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999). 
15 The current of deep disagreement occurring within Taylor’s modern social imaginary 
resembles Rawls “reasonable pluralism”: John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), at 36 (that a “permanent feature of the public culture of democracy” is a 
diversity of “reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines”). As 
Dyzenhaus observes, Rawlsian political liberalism cannot escape the fact of irreducible conflict, 
“because the values about which it claims consensus and which form the basis of its neutrality are 
both controversial and partisan”. See David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, 
Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 233 
[hereinafter “Dyzenhaus”]. 
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occupied by various contingent political projects.16 Conflict about justice, 
then, is endemic to the modern democratic state. The state, nevertheless, 
must be seen to be neutral as between the variety of life projects available 
to individuals in the modern social imaginary.17 No “one person or group” 
can exclusively be associated with the state.18 The ends to be pursued, in 
other words, are multifarious and seem to be “increasing without end”.19 It 
is our communal task to facilitate their realization or at least not get in the 
way without good reasons. It might be, then, that justice in the modern era 
is premised on nothing more than generating institutions and procedures 
for the fair resolution of moral conflict.20 
What are the normative premises that underlie the modern social 
imaginary? In the place of the sacred, Taylor proffers human rights, de-
mocracy and equality as generating the normative glue that hold together 
modern polities.21 Taylor oversimplifies by suggesting there is agreement 
in the West over what these things mean in practice. Indeed, it is in the 
course of specifying what equality or democracy means in practice that 
disagreement stubbornly persists.22 So there is little in the way of guid-
ance about how these norms are to be realized in contemporary western 
society. Taylor only points to modern bills of rights as being “the clearest 
expression of our modern idea of a moral order underlying the political, 
which the political has to respect”.23 Taylor provides little more in the 
way of tools for resolving disagreement over the meaning of such norms. 
We are forced to look elsewhere for further guidance. I will argue that 
high courts in Canada and elsewhere now look to proportionality analysis 
to help resolve this crisis of conflict.  
                                                                                                             
16 Claude Lefort, “Reversibility: Political Freedom and the Freedom of the Individual” in 
Democracy and Political Theory, translated by David Macey (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988) 165, at 168-69. 
17 The secular state cannot, of course, be neutral, as it has as its overriding object the 
cultivation of the citizen-subject. See Talal Assad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
18 Charles Taylor, “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism” [hereinafter 
“Taylor, ‘Radical Redefinition of Secularism’”] in Eduardo Mendieta & Jonathan VanAntwerpen, 
eds., The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) 34, 
at 47. 
19 Taylor, A Secular Age, supra, note 7, at 437. 
20 Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), at 52-53. 
21 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, supra, note 7, at 49. 
22 David Kennedy, The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), at 11.  
23 Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, supra, note 7, at 173; Taylor, A Secular Age, supra, 
note 7, at 447. 
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III. THE RISE OF BUREAUCRATIZED JUSTICE 
Max Weber’s diagnosis of our “disenchanted” world provides the 
backdrop for Taylor’s modern social imaginary. We now have access, 
Weber declares, to “technical means and calculations” to solve modern 
problems. There is no longer a need to have recourse to “magical means” 
so as “to master or implore the spirits”.24 In this part, I turn to Weber’s 
formulation of modern rationality and bureaucracy, outlined in his post-
humously published treatise Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and 
Society) (1978), in order to identify mechanisms for resolving disagreement 
that many high courts favour.25 Weber anticipates by almost a century, 
I suggest, the turn to proportionality on a nearly global scale.  
Weber initially distinguishes between different ideal types of social 
action, two of which mostly concern us here and which serve as place 
holders for a discussion of formal and substantive rationality: “instru-
mentally rational” action and “value rational” action.26 Value rational 
action consciously puts into practice convictions generated by ethical, 
religious or some other value or “cause”.27 Instrumentally rational action, 
by contrast, is determined by the “expectations” of human behaviour; 
these expectations are the “means” used “for the attainment of the actor’s 
own rationally pursued and calculated ends”.28 “Action is instrumentally 
rational when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all ra-
tionally taken into account and weighed”, declares Weber.29 The choice 
between alternative ends might be determined in a value rational manner, 
Weber admits, which will “always [be] irrational”.30 For this reason, We-
ber’s discussion of instrumental action is focused exclusively on choice 
of means.31  
Weber transposes these ideal types in his discussion of the economy, 
where he contrasts “formal rationality” of economic action (in which 
                                                                                                             
24 Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation” in H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 129, at 139. 
25 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, ed. by 
Gunther Roth & Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) [hereinafter “Weber, 
Economy and Society”]. 
26 Id., at 24. 
27 Id., at 25. 
28 Id., at 24. 
29 Id., at 26. 
30 Id. 
31 The rational actor can take as a given the choice of ends but may rank them in order of 
priority according to the principle of “marginal utility” (id.). 
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needs are satisfied based on impersonal technical calculation) with “sub-
stantive rationality” (in which the provision of basic needs is shaped by 
the pursuit of some ultimate value).32 The formal and the substantive also 
are foundational to his discussions of law and bureaucracy, where they 
undergo further refining.33  
In his discussion of categories of legal thought, Weber distinguishes 
between: (1) rational and irrational lawmaking and lawfinding; and 
(2) formal and substantive legality. This gives rise to a grid of four possi-
bilities;34 formal irrational rule is rule not by intellect but by something 
analogous to an oracle; substantively irrational rule is the concrete case 
decided with reference to political, ethical or other non-legal norms, what 
he derisively called “khadi justice”.35 All formal law is rational law, ob-
serves Weber.36 The degree of formality is determined by the degree to 
which outcomes are guided by an identifiable system of rules laid down 
in advance and generalizable.37 Substantively rational law, by contrast, is 
distinguished on the basis that values exogenous to the formal legal sys-
tem determine outcomes: it is influenced “by norms different from those 
obtained through logical generalization of abstract interpretations of 
meaning”.38 The key distinction, again, is that between the formally ra-
tional and the substantively rational. Without recourse to magic or to 
spirits to resolve conflicting social ends, there is a high likelihood of dis-
agreement about the results issuing out of substantive legal rational 
reasoning. In our disenchanted world, it is formal legal rationality that 
will increasingly define modern legal order, Weber maintains. It reaches 
its “highest measure” in his ideal typical system of “logically formal” 
rationality.39 
                                                                                                             
32 Id., at 85. 
33 Rheinstein, supra, note 8, at l. 
34 Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber (London: Edward Arnold, 1983), at 76 [hereinafter 
“Kronman”]; David M. Trubek, “Max Weber and the Rise of Capitalism” (1972) Wis. L. Rev. 720, 
at 729 [hereinafter “Trubek”]. 
35 Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 656, 976. 
36 Id. 
37 Kronman, supra, note 34, at 73. 
38 Id., at 76; Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 657. 
39 Weber describes logical formal rationality in this key passage:  
Present-day legal science, at least in those forms which have achieved the highest meas-
ure of methodological and logical rationality, i.e. those which have been produced 
through the legal science of the Pandectist’s Civil Law, proceeds from the following five 
postulates: viz., first, that every concrete legal decision be the “application” of an abstract 
legal proposition to a concrete “fact situation”; second, that it must be possible in every 
concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal propositions by means of legal 
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Turning to Weber’s discussion of bureaucracy, it is here that formally 
rational rule is most fully developed and provocatively elucidated.40 It is 
provocative because Weber deliberately does not distinguish too care-
fully between various forms of bureaucratic rule.41 He subsumes under 
“bureaucracy” the state’s “administrative staff [who] successfully up-
holds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in 
the enforcement of its order”.42 Weber does not talk very much about 
judges — the “lawfinders”, he calls them, as opposed to the “lawgivers” 
(legislators).43 Instead, he prefers to assimilate under his discussion of 
bureaucratic rationality all forms of state administration, including the 
administration of justice.44 Which is not to say that bureaucrats are pre-
cisely like judges,45 only that judges (civilian ones, in particular) bear 
many of the hallmarks Weber associates with a professionalized bureauc-
racy. The predominant characteristics of modern bureaucratic rule 
include: rule by professional administrators, with clear jurisdictional re-
sponsibilities, operating under a hierarchical order, managing written 
documents (files) and following depersonalized general rules previously 
laid down.46 The officeholder is appointed to serve a “vocation” for 
which she is professionally trained (typically requiring some form of 
higher education) and for which she receives a salary and security of ten-
ure (often for life or with good behaviour).47 
                                                                                                             
logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a “gapless” system of legal 
propositions, or must, at least, be treated as it were such a gapless system; fourth, that 
whatever cannot be “construed” rationally in legal terms is also legally irrelevant; and 
fifth, that every social action of human beings must always be visualized as either an 
“application” or “execution” of legal propositions, or as an “infringement” thereof, since 
the “gaplessness” of the legal system must result in a gapless “legal ordering” of all so-
cial conduct” (id., at 657-58).  
40 Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Anchor Books, 
1960), at 386. 
41 See also Kennedy, Critique, supra, note 8, at 368-69; Duncan Kennedy, “The 
Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality or Max Weber’s Sociology in the 
Geneaology of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought” (2004) 55 Hastings L.J. 1031, at 
1040 [hereinafter “Kennedy, ‘Disenchantment’”]. 
42 Weber, Economy and Society”, supra, note 25, at 54 (emphasis in original). 
43 Isher-Paul Sahni, “Vanished Mediators: On the Residual Status of Judges in Max 
Weber’s ‘Sociology of Law’” (2006) 6 J. Classical Sociology 177, at 177.  
44 Kennedy, “Disenchantment”, supra, note 41, at 1040. 
45 Mattias Kumm, “Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and 
Limits of the Proportionality Requirement” [hereinafter “Kumm”] in George Pavlakos, ed., Law, 
Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 131, 
at 140, n. 21. 
46 Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 957-59. 
47 Id., at 960ff. 
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What does the “bureaucratization of justice” look like? A “system of 
rationally debatable ‘reasons’ stands behind every act of bureaucratic 
administration, namely”, Weber writes, “either subsumption under norms, 
or a weighing of ends and means”.48 By norms, Weber appears to be 
referring to conventional understandings about law and justice.49 Weber 
treats dispute resolution via ends-means calculations, however, as a more 
evolved and preferred mode of legal rationality. This is because the 
determination of whether social action is rationally purposeful action is 
best undertaken with reference to the choice of means that have been 
adopted rather than having recourse to a ranking of ultimate ends. An 
assessment of means generates “the highest degree of verifiable certainty”, 
he writes, while a focus on ends “often cannot be understood completely”.50 
In the former case, the relation of means and end will be clearly 
understandable on grounds of experience, “particularly where the choice of 
means was inevitable”.51 The bureaucratization of legality, insofar as it is 
intended to promote purposeful rational action, will increasingly look to 
assessments of means over ends.  
Weber does not stipulate, however, that judicial functions are better 
served under means-ends rationalizations. He does anticipate, however, 
the predictable objections to his characterization of the “modern judge as 
an automaton into which legal documents and fees are stuffed at the top 
in order that it may spill forth the verdict at the bottom, along with 
reasons, read mechanically from codified paragraphs”.52 Such a 
conception would angrily be rejected, he admits, even though “a certain 
approximation of this type would precisely be implied by a consistent 
bureaucratization of justice”.53 Weber appears to confine these 
disparaging remarks to German and continental judges. Weber 
characterizes common law judging based on precedent, however, in not 
much more favourable terms.54 Common law judging is an “empirical 
art” associated with khadi justice, he writes, and therefore “less rational 
                                                                                                             
48 Id., at 979 (emphasis added). 
49 Wolfgang Schluchter, The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber’s Developmental 
History, translated by Guenther Roth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), at 44 
[hereinafter “Schluchter”].  
50 Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 5. 
51 Id., at 18. 
52 Id., at 979. 
53 Id. Weber derisively describes the churning of a judicial “slot machine into which one just 
drops the facts (plus the fee) in order to have it spew out the decision (plus opinion)” (id., at 886). 
54 Id., at c.viii. 
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and less bureaucratic” because focused on the individual case.55 A more 
sympathetic appreciation for the common law method is suggested 
elsewhere, however.56 In an essay on “‘Roman’ and ‘Germanic’ Law”, 
Weber appears to admire the common law judge’s penchant for not 
“avoid[ing] (in certain cases) the ethical consideration of economic 
events”.57 By contrast, the “German judge throws the executioner’s 
sword far away and cries out for formal characteristics”.58 This will 
ensure, he observes, that the “social importance of the administration of 
civil law will remain relatively modest”.59 Expressions of admiration for 
the system of English justice suggests, as Ewing argues, that the common 
law was not “deviant” but sufficiently formal, rational and calculable to 
facilitate the rise of capitalism, in the sociological sense.60 Nevertheless, 
even common law judges, Weber warns, will not resist the spread of 
bureaucratized justice. He foresees that “the traditional position of the 
English judge is also likely to be transformed permanently and 
profoundly” by these same forces.61 
                                                                                                             
55 Id., at 890, 976; Schluchter, supra, note 49, at 90-91. “Quite definitely”, Weber writes, 
“English law-finding is not, like that of the Continent, ‘application’ of ‘legal propositions’ logically 
derived from statutory texts” (in Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 317). 
56 See the important essay by Isher-Paul Sahni, “Max Weber’s Sociology of Law” (2009) 
9 J. Classical Sociology 209, at 215, which argues that Weber “implicitly extols the English 
administration of justice”. 
57 Id., at 188; Max Weber, “‘Roman’ and ‘Germanic’ Law” (1985) 13 Int’l J. Sociology 237 
[hereinafter “Weber, ‘“Roman” and “Germanic” Law’”], at 244. Weber appeared to admire English 
parliamentary forms of government, enabling rule by an educated political elite, which he sought to 
replicate, to some degree, in Germany. See Weber, “Parliament and Government”, supra, note 2; 
Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920, translated by Michael S. 
Steinberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), at 88, 397 [hereinafter “Mommsen”]. On 
Weber’s affinity for English parliamentism and the tension with the need for responsible political 
leadership (which he labelled “caesarism” [1918]), see Sven Eliaeson, “Constitutional Caesarism: 
Weber’s Politics in their German Context” in Stephen Turner, ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 131.  
58 Weber, “‘Roman’ and ‘Germanic’ Law”, supra, note 57, at 245. 
59 Id. 
60 Sally Ewing, “Formal Justice and the Spirit of Capitalism: Max Weber’s Sociology of 
Law” (1987) 21 Law & Soc’y Rev. 487, at 499 [hereinafter “Ewing”]. The problem of England is 
discussed in Trubek, supra, note 34, at 746-48. 
61 Id., at 894. This appears to contradict an observation Weber makes elsewhere, that there 
is no “visible tendency towards a transformation of the English legal system in the direction of the 
continental under the impetus of the capitalist economy”. He notes that where the two systems 
“compete with one another, as in Canada, the Common Law has come out on top and has overcome 
the continental alternative rather quickly” (in id., at 318). The contradiction can be resolved: Weber 
anticipates convergence not by reason of capitalism’s inexorable force but due to an increase in the 
“bureaucratization of formal legislation”. See Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 894. 
Weber’s sociological reading of the Canadian experience — the only such reference I have found — 
seems hard to reconcile with the fact of Canadian bijuralism. 
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This seeming emptying of modern law of its moral content 
precipitated indignant attacks from many commentators. Habermas, for 
instance, accuses Weber of having smoothed the path for the rise of the 
Third Reich and its principal legal apologist, Carl Schmitt, whom he 
characterizes as Weber’s “legitimate pupil”.62 This is a bit far-fetched.63 
Wolfgang Schluchter offers a more nuanced interpretation of the moral 
content of Weber’s law. He maintains that Weber acknowledged 
lawmaking and lawfinding as having contemporaneously both procedural 
and substantive elements, either of which may predominate.64 Though 
“separate things”, Weber acknowledged in his discussion of formal and 
substantive rationality in the context of the economy, they “may coincide 
empirically”.65 Ethical and moral content, in other words, is inevitably 
internal to legal rationality.66 As law becomes increasingly generalized 
and systematized, substantive rationality becomes subsumed under 
formal rationality. “Legal development isolates, abstracts and hence 
formalizes both the formal and substantive components of law”, 
Schluchter observes.67 The dichotomy between form and substance is 
therefore smoothed over in Weber’s internal account of law. The 
dichotomy is pronounced, however, when the legal order is juxtaposed 
with norms drawn from non-legal fields, that is, when Weber adopts an 
external point of view.68 
The best evidence of the substantive element in Weber’s account of 
formal legal rationality is that law and administration has as its purpose 
securing the needs of business for calculability and predictability.69 
Modern forms of economic organization mandate increasingly formally 
rational legal systems and so necessitate the spread of bureaucratic 
organization. “[F]ormal and substantive rationality”, Weber admits, 
                                                                                                             
62 Mommsen, supra, note 57, at 410. 
63 Ewing, supra, note 60, at 504; Dyzenhaus, supra, note 15, at 236. 
64 Schluchter, supra, note 49, at 88. 
65 Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 108. 
66 Weber famously acknowledged, for instance, the modern indebtedness to “achievements” 
secured in “the age of the Rights of Man” (id., at 1403); also Weber, “Parliament and Government”, 
supra, note 2, at 159. On the difficulty of sustaining a strict separation between the formal and the 
substantive, and their methodological presuppositions, see Martin Albrow, “Legal Positivism and 
Bourgeois Materialism: Max Weber’s View of the Sociology of Law” (1975) 2 Brit. J.L. & Soc. 14, 
at 28 [hereinafter “Albrow”]. 
67 Schluchter, supra, note 49, at 91. 
68 Id. 
69 David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1985), at 274-76 [hereinafter “Beetham”]. 
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“coincide to a relatively high degree” in market matters.70 It is “primarily 
the capitalist market economy which demands that the official business 
of public administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, 
continuously, and with as much speed as possible”, Weber maintains.71 
As in the market, bureaucracy necessitates the “discharge of business 
according to calculable rules and ‘without regard to persons’”.72 It is not 
the case, however, that the “propertyless masses” would reap many 
benefits from formally rational “bourgeois” law.73 Indeed, legality alone 
likely is insufficient to beget legitimacy. Weber predicts, for these 
reasons, the inevitable pressures to “deformalize” law in order to 
advance the goals of substantive justice. These pressures unavoidably 
“collide with the formalism and the rule-bound and cool ‘matter-of-
factness’ of bureaucratic administration”.74 This seemingly deformalized 
account of law — of a “pure and timeless rationality”75 — is 
significantly tainted, then, by its substantive content, namely, an 
ideological vindication of capitalism’s relentless pursuit of profit.76  
IV. IS PROPORTIONALITY ANTIFORMALIST? 
Proportionality review is preoccupied with measuring relationships 
between means and ends for the purpose of determining whether rights 
limitations are constitutionally permissible. An apex court typically will 
first address the preliminary question of the “necessity” of the law: in 
Canadian parlance, is the legislative objective sufficiently pressing and 
substantial to limit constitutional rights and freedoms? So there is a 
concern with ends, but courts rarely find objectives to be insufficiently 
pressing.77 A series of sub-inquiries, focused on ends-means relations, 
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comprise the proportionality inquiry. First, are the means adopted 
suitable for advancing the objective (“rational connection”); second, do 
the means infringe on those rights as little as necessary (“least restrictive 
means”); and, third, is the benefit gained by the legislative scheme 
proportionate to the deleterious effect on rights (“proportionate effect”)? 
Why, we might ask, is this not antiformalist — the sort of substantive 
reasoning that is in tension with the “cool matter of factness” of formal 
legal reasoning? Duncan Kennedy makes precisely this claim, 
analogizing U.S.-style balancing to a mere technical “means of pacifying 
conflicts of interest”.78 With no real coherence — it certainly is not a 
closed and gapless system — a Weberian “disenchantment” has set in 
giving rise to a new ideal type of “policy argument”, akin to a 
“formalized substantive rationality”, maintains Kennedy.79 Policy 
analysis is committed to “balancing conflicting policies, with an eye to 
consequences, in a context in which rules represent no more than the 
means to implement the resulting compromise”.80 Elsewhere, Kennedy 
likens U.S.-style “balancing” to proportionality review in European 
public law. They seem to be “identical”, he surmises, and suggests that 
the origins of German proportionality review are traceable to the 
influence of U.S. balancing that arose in response to the formalism of 
classical legal thought.81  
At the high level of abstraction that Kennedy describes this “single 
evolving template”, there is an instructive overlap between the two ap-
proaches.82 From the perspective (or “subjective belief” 83) of the relevant 
actors (judges, lawyers, even law students), however, there may be little 
overlap. Proportionality, for these actors, does not exhibit features of 
U.S.-style judicial policymaking as described by Kennedy: a “last re-
sort”, when “logical methods have ‘run out’”, with no consensus as to 
                                                                                                             
78 Weber, Economy and Society, supra, note 25, at 894; Kennedy, “Disenchantment”, 
supra, note 41; Duncan Kennedy, “A Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality in Private Law” 
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when the judiciary should have recourse to its methods.84 Instead, it is 
understood as a formalistic template, which applies in all constitutional 
cases and which is “less free” — more “controlled” and “predictable” a 
technique — than balancing. 85 
Rather than having a U.S. genealogy, the origins of German propor-
tionality doctrine are traceable back to Prussian administrative courts of 
the late 19th century that developed the method in order to determine 
whether exercises of state police powers were excessive.86 The method-
ology, Cohen-Ilaya and Porat explain, “remained essentially formalistic”: 
what guided administrative law court rulings in this period was a “more 
formal means-ends analysis” rather than a “more substantive (balanc-
ing)” exercise.87 Proportionality review, according to this historical 
account, “was completely neutral and ‘entirely independent of any ideol-
ogy’”.88 In the next part, I argue that modern approaches to 
proportionality (both judicial and scholarly) are entirely consistent with 
this formalistic, rationalizing tendency. Indeed, one explanation for the 
rapid, worldwide embrace of proportionality by high courts is that it as-
sists judges in maintaining a semblance of neutrality at a time when there 
is much disagreement over the meaning of constitutional essentials. 
This is not to say that proportionality’s proponents have succeeded in 
emptying their preferred method of its substantive content. To the 
contrary, there is much going on under the guise of proportionality 
review that aims to pass for indifference as to ends and as to the 
correlation between means and ends. In which case, it may be that 
modern approaches look more like exercises in U.S.-style balancing. 
This is apparent in Weber’s analysis of the relationship between law and 
capitalism.89 Weber even admits that, “as far as facts are concerned”, the 
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law is not a convincingly “gapless” system.90 With Kennedy, we should 
no longer be under the illusion that the “system” is neutral and “in some 
sense produces the norms that decide cases”.91 Instead, we should be 
attentive to the ways in which judicial techniques, particularly those with 
successful global take-up, both bracket certain inquiries and serve 
particular interests. Elsewhere I have characterized the process, 
following Bourdieu, as a site of struggle over the ability to name one’s 
reality as common sense — a power to ordain that which is obvious or 
self-evident.92 There remains the hope among its proponents, 
nonetheless, that proportionality will have a “disciplining and 
rationalizing effect” such as to render its results less arbitrary and more 
predictable.93 
V. PROPORTIONALITY’S FORMALITIES APPLIED 
It is surprising that the contemporary literature on the rise of propor-
tionality review, within Canada and globally, mostly has missed this 
connection to Weber.94 Many of the critiques of means-ends rationality 
review were anticipated in debates with Weber, for instance, that propor-
tionality review elides the complexity of rights and the necessity for 
moral evaluation in determining the content and scope of rights.95 De-
fenders of proportionality try to appease their critics by rejecting the 
claim that proportionality is devoid of any moral reasoning (as does 
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Schluchter).96 At the same time, defenders of proportionality applaud its 
structure of reasoning as it generates “more rationality towards the whole 
process” of weighing rights.97 Indeed, the literature is replete with claims 
about improving the “rationality” of constitutional decisionmaking (and 
this without reference to “rational connection” or “suitability” criteria 
associated with proportionality review).  
More striking is the prevalence of mathematical or mechanical im-
agery,98 which for Weber was the mark of modern rational thought. 
According to Robert Alexy’s influential account, generalizing from the 
work of the German Constitutional Court, the greater the intensity of the 
infringement, the greater must be satisfaction of some countervailing 
constitutional principle.99 This is reduced to a “law of balancing”100 and 
the generation of a mathematical model Alexy calls the “weight for-
mula”.101 Proportionality’s defenders, however, deny that constitutional 
rights problems will always be answered by having recourse to the logic 
of numbers. Instead, things such as Alexy’s “weight formula” help make 
the process more “rational”. Admitting that proportionality aspires to 
have the precision of mathematics, the “model [still] works fine without 
any use of numbers”, admit Klatt and Meister.102 
We can surmise that judges are aware of the benefits of having re-
course to proportionality’s forms of argument. Indeed, it is remarkable 
how widely the method has been embraced by apex courts in  
constitutional democracies around the world,103 even popping up occa-
sionally in the U.S. Supreme Court, the principal outlier in the field.104 
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Proportionality review, judges must assume, looks more precise, objec-
tive and therefore legitimate than is the second-guessing of legislative 
ends. Yet, in so doing, judges replicate roles performed by lawmakers 
and their functionaries, tailoring laws without having to engage in too 
many value judgments (which are otherwise suppressed). 
The Canadian evidence in this regard is incontrovertible. We have 
seen the Supreme Court of Canada pretty much abandon the first two 
limbs of its inquiry (“pressing and substantial objective” and “rational 
connection”) in order to speed ahead to the seemingly more scientific 
“less restrictive means” inquiry.105 Monahan and Petter astutely describe 
this as the “democracy-perfecting” stage of the Court’s analysis.106 No 
second-guessing here, only an opportunity to sit in the shoes of the legis-
lators and, if need be, discipline them into being better tailors. This helps 
to explain the Courts’ indignant response to the government of Canada 
when it shielded, under the cloak of cabinet confidentiality, evidence of 
less restrictive alternatives in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney 
General).107 The Court would not condone being denied the material 
with which to perform its democracy-perfecting functions.108 
Having recourse to a couple of other Supreme Court of Canada cases 
helps to sustain the claim that the judicial role in proportionality review is 
a form of bureaucratic reasoning anticipated by Weber. R. v. Edwards 
Books and Art Ltd.109 provides an early example where the Court sought to 
weigh competing interests pitted against each other, namely, those of 
sabbatarians and retail sector workers. In the context of determining 
whether it was less impairing of religious freedom to allow a full Sunday 
exemption for sabbatarians, Dickson C.J.C. carefully calibrated the 
interests of each and concluded that a full exemption (under the Court’s 
least restrictive means analysis) would “entail a substantial disruption of 
the quality of the pause day”.110 Instead, Dickson C.J.C. preferred to 
maximize the benefit of a common pause day to Ontario workers by 
deferring to the legislative solution of limiting retail space to 5,000 square 
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feet and to no more than seven employees. Deferring to policy choices 
already made, the Court conceded it could do no better than the legislature 
in tailoring means to ends. 
A rigid bureaucratic rationality underlay McLachlin C.J.C.’s majority 
opinion in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony v. Alberta.111 Deferring to 
Alberta’s stated policy objective for having photos taken for driver’s licences 
— in order to produce a digital data bank of all drivers so as to reduce iden-
tity theft in the province (not for the purpose of improving road safety) — 
McLachlin C.J.C. single-mindedly refused to deviate from the government’s 
aim of having a one-to-one correspondence between drivers and photos. 
Anything less, she complained, would lead to “some increase in risk  
and impairment of the government goal”.112 Any alternative scheme would 
“significantly compromise”113 and would not “substantially satisfy” that 
goal.114 This astonishing level of deference to legislative objectives and its 
optimization at any cost, though defensible under a version of proportional-
ity analysis, underscores the Court’s concession of policy grounds to 
lawmakers. The Court’s rigid adherence to the logic of its proportionality 
analysis is significantly undermined by its abandonment at the proportionate 
effects stage and by the embrace of a new standard of “meaningful 
choice”.115 Looking much less like typical means-ends analysis in this fourth 
and final stage, renders the ruling aberrant. The joint dissent of LeBel and 
Fish JJ. (in addition to the dissent of Abella J.) appears to be more honest, by 
contrast. The search under section 1, they write, is to “reach a better  
balance” rather than considering alternatives based “on a standard of maxi-
mal consistency with the stated objective”.116 The dissenting justices seem  
to admit that there is more going on than the majority admits — that the 
logic of proportionality gives rise to contestable value judgments. 
This approach to balancing, in which ends and means are carefully 
calibrated so as to maximize rights, can be found in the work of high 
courts in other jurisdictions: it is epitomized by President Aharon Barak 
of the Supreme Court of Israel ruling in Beit Sourik.117 The case 
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concerned a 40-kilometre stretch of the wall separating Israel from the West 
Bank. Palestinian villagers sought to divert construction of the “fence” so as 
not to be separated from their agricultural lands. The petitioners claimed 
that fundamental rights, including those to property, freedom of 
movement, occupation and religion, were infringed. Though authority to 
erect the fence was sanctioned by the Court, President Barak concluded (in 
the last branch of proportionality, “in the narrow sense”) that the fence’s 
route could be adjusted. Though resulting in a minutely diminished 
security advantage, adjustment would result in a correspondingly 
significant increase in the satisfaction of the petitioners’ basic rights.118 
Barak’s conclusion resonated in a discourse of quantifiable harms and 
benefits:  
The gap between the security provided by the military commander’s 
approach and the security provided by the alternate route is minute, as 
compared to the large difference between a fence that separates the 
local inhabitants from their lands, and a fence which does not 
separate the two (or which creates a separation which is smaller and 
possible to live with).119 
The mathematical merit of proportionality has not been lost on judges 
in many high courts around the world. It also has not been lost on agents 
promoting new transnational legal institutions that perform adjudicative 
functions. In the field of international investment law, for instance, invest-
ment tribunals have been wading into controversial policy domains, 
limiting state capacity in order to protect the interests of foreign inves-
tors.120 Scholars in the field have responded by advocating the adoption of 
proportionality as a means of resolving the legitimacy problems that con-
tinue to plague the system. “Intense concerns about legitimacy in the 
system”, it has been said, “should drive a rapid adoption of proportionality 
analysis as a standard technique”.121 Anything less would be “suicidal”.122 
                                                                                                             
118 Id., at para. 61. 
119 Id.; Barak, “Proportionality”, supra, note 93, at 354. 
120 David Schneiderman, Resisting Economic Globalization: Critical Theory and 
International Investment Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
121 Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, “Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair 
and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law” in Benedict 
Kingsbury et al., eds., El Nuevo Derecho Administrativo Global en América Latina: Desafíos para 
las Inversiones Extranjeras, La Regulación Nacional y el Financiamiento para el Desarrollo (RPA, 
2009), online: <www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/GALBAbook.pdf>. 
122 Alec Stone Sweet, “Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier” (2010) 
4(1) L. & Ethics Human Rights 47, at 75. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) JUDGING IN SECULAR TIMES 575 
This is not to say, returning to the Canadian example, that the 
Supreme Court of Canada is focused single-mindedly on ends-means 
rationality review. There is much else going on, as LeBel and Fish JJ. 
Intimate in Hutterian Brethren,123 including the valuing of certain 
activities and the devaluing of others, for example, in the Court’s 
freedom of expression cases124 — value judgments in these sorts of cases 
being “inevitable”.125 There is, in other words, much moralizing going 
on, although the Court typically does not wish to emphasize this aspect 
of its work.126 It would prefer to be seen to be focusing on more objective 
criteria that are susceptible to empirical evaluation — a function that 
enlightened bureaucratic reason is well equipped to perform. 
VI. CONCLUSION: NOBODY DOES IT BETTER? 
The judicial embrace of proportionality analysis on a worldwide scale 
raises the question of whether the judicial branch is best suited to perform 
functions associated with bureaucratized justice. Recall that Weber 
subsumes under the umbrella of bureaucratic reasoning the judicial 
function: the bureaucratization of justice does not carefully distinguish 
between judicial reasoning and that of other functionaries. The embrace of 
judicial review focused almost exclusively on ends-means analysis, I have 
argued, amounts to an admission on the part of the judicial branch that they 
have given up serving functions other than bureaucratic ones. 
Questions arise not only about suitability, but also about 
institutional capacity. With a judicial focus squarely on appropriate 
means, the question of proof perennially arises. However adequate the 
evidentiary record, it typically points in different directions.127 With 
what techniques should the judiciary resolve evidentiary disagreement? 
Having to second-guess policy decisions “under conditions of factual 
uncertainty”, courts encounter an “enormous institutional dilemma” 
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concerning questions of deference.128 What comparative advantage does 
the judicial branch bring to the performance of these functions? Might 
some other, perhaps not yet envisaged, institution be better suited to do 
this sort of work? Late 19th-century Prussian administrative law courts, 
credited with having originated proportionality doctrine on the 
Continent, for instance, were composed at various levels of a mix of 
jurists, bureaucrats and laypersons.129 
I cannot provide fulsome answers to these questions by way of a 
conclusion. Instead, I propose we return to Weber’s suggestive account 
of the rise of formal legal rationality. Weber associates its ascendance 
with the expansion of professional legal training in university settings. 
The fourth and final stage of legal development, Weber writes, follows 
upon the “systematic elaboration of law and professionalized administra-
tion of justice by persons who have received their legal training in a 
learned and formally logical matter”.130 It is legal education, in either its 
continental or common law variants, which plays a key role in generating 
“a dependable and professional group of administrators”.131 “[G]eneral 
economic and social conditions” only indirectly influence the increasing 
rationalization of law, Weber maintains. Instead, it is the “prevailing type 
of legal education, i.e., the mode of training of the practitioners of the 
law, [which] has been more important than any other factor”.132  
Legal education may be performing similar functions today. Even 
though the judicial arm may not be best suited to undertake the kind of 
policy second-guessing expected under proportionality review, the 
institutions of legal education are generating the conditions for more 
expert, and more formally rational, application of its techniques. To the 
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extent that law schools make proportionality review central to their 
teaching (in constitutional, European, and international trade and 
investment law, for instance), then we can assume that lawyers making 
argument and justices deciding cases will be better equipped to do so. 
Legal education focused on means-ends rationality review, in other 
words, will aid in the better performance of techniques associated with 
this judicial function. Which is not to say that another more specialized 
branch may not do better. But given the allure of seemingly neutral 
methods, the judicial branch is likely to jealously guard the continuing 
performance of this function. In our disenchanted times, it is, after all, 
one of the few remaining things they claim to do well.  

